Religion in post-communist Albania: Muslims, Christians and the concept of 'culture' (Devoll, South Albania) by De Rapper, Gilles
Religion in post-communist Albania: Muslims,
Christians and the concept of ’culture’ (Devoll, South
Albania)
Gilles De Rapper
To cite this version:
Gilles De Rapper. Religion in post-communist Albania: Muslims, Christians and the concept
of ’culture’ (Devoll, South Albania). Anthropological Notebooks , Slovenian Anthropological
Society, 2008, 14 (2), pp.31-45. <halshs-00327200>
HAL Id: halshs-00327200
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00327200
Submitted on 7 Oct 2008
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Article publié dans Anthropological Notebooks 14, 2 (2008), p. 31-45 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RELIGION IN POST-COMMUNIST ALBANIA 
Muslims, Christians and the idea of ‘culture’ in Devoll, Southern Albania 
 
 
 
Gilles de Rapper 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Religion is often a sensitive topic in Albania, especially when it comes to the division 
of society into two or more ‘religious communities’. Throughout the 20th century, the 
existence of Muslim and Christian communities has been seen as a threat to national unity. 
The antireligious politics followed by socialist Albania after 1944, which culminated in 1967 
with the abolishment of religion and the destruction of many cult places, can be seen as a 
response to this threat. Its failure to erase religious practices and beliefs among the 
population, together with the ‘resurfacing’ of religious communities after 1990, have 
maintained the idea that religion can lead to division. At the same time, the fact that a 
majority of Albanians are Muslims has been considered to be an obstacle on their road 
towards Europe and the West (Clayer 2002). This has been especially the case since the 
turn of this century, when Islam came to be associated with fanaticism and terrorism in the 
media and public opinion of [32] most Western countries, while Albanians were, on the 
contrary, eager to assert their belonging to the Western world after fifty years on the other 
side of the Iron Curtain. 
 
My hypothesis in this paper is that there is a discrepancy between the representation 
of religious division as a threat on the one hand, and the reality of religious coexistence on 
the other. I do not mean however that the actual relations between Muslims and Christians 
should only be conceived of in terms of tolerance and harmony, as is often argued in 
answer to the stigma of fanaticism and conflict. Both the fear of religious extremism and 
the myth of harmony consider Albanian Muslims and Christians as belonging to worldwide 
religious communities or, in other words, as local representatives of Islam and Christianity. 
They rely on the idea of global identities of Muslims and Christians or, to put it another 
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way, on the idea that to be Muslim or Christian in Albania is not basically different from 
being Muslim or Christian anywhere else. I argue that, on the contrary, the actual relations 
between Muslims and Christians in Albania should be considered as embedded in local 
configurations and should first be understood in their local contexts. We should first try to 
understand what it means to be Muslim or Christian in each particular context. We shall 
then realise not only what is peculiar in the religious situation of Albania, but also how this 
situation differs from one region to another within the Albanian context. 
 
In a previous paper, I made an attempt to draw a picture of Muslim/Christian 
relations from the observation of the local forms they take in a district of southeastern 
Albania known as Devoll. This picture was drawn by taking into account spatial 
distribution, level of intermarriage, names, and stereotypes, and relations with the state, 
rather than strictly religious beliefs and practices (de Rapper 2002b). In the present paper, 
in order to complete the understanding of the coexistence of Muslims and Christians at the 
local level, i.e. to grasp the meaning, for individuals, of religious belonging and affiliation, I 
suggest making use of a local category: the idea of ‘culture’ (kulturë). The notion of ‘culture’ 
is locally used to classify individuals and collectives and to rank them on a scale of moral 
value: some people ‘have culture’ (they are me kulturë), others have not (they are pa kulturë). 
‘Culture’, as it is understood in that particular district – and, as far as I know, in other parts 
of southern Albania – is not specifically concerned with religion: one can ‘have culture’ 
whatever one’s religious affiliation or degree of devotion. It is, however, common to hear 
comments on Muslims or Christians in terms of their level of ‘culture’. And in most cases, 
interestingly, Christians are granted more ‘culture’ than Muslims. 
 
The aim of this paper is to understand the meaning of such statements about the 
level of ‘culture’ of Muslims and Christians and to explain the use of the category of 
‘culture’ in relation to the present state of Muslim/Christian relations. In the first section, I 
give an overview of religious coexistence in the Devoll district of southeastern Albania. 
Section 2 is a presentation of ‘culture’ as a local category. The third section brings together 
vernacular explanations of the higher level of ‘culture’ granted to the Christian part of the 
population with historical data concerning the socio-economic position of both 
communities. In the last part of the paper, I look at the way ‘culture’ is negotiated by 
Muslims and Christians, a negotiation that is revealing of the positions occupied by each 
‘religion’ in various configurations. Ethnographic data were collected in 1995-1996 during a 
one-year stay in several villages of Devoll. 
 
 
Muslims and Christians in Devoll 
 
[33] Devoll is a district (rreth) located in southeastern Albania, on the border with 
Greece. It consists of forty-four villages distributed around its centre, the small town of 
Bilisht (around 8000 inhabitants in 1995), which lies on the road leading from the city of 
Korçë and central Albania to the border post of Kapshticë/Kristalopigi, and from there to 
Greece. Most of the villages are situated on both sides of a large and relatively flat valley, in 
the middle of which flows the river Devoll. This part of the valley is locally called Fusha, 
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‘the plain’, or Devolli i poshtëm, ‘Lower-Devoll’. Villages are generally settled at the foot of 
low hills and mountains, between agricultural lands on one side and pastures and forests on 
the other, although some of them, said to be ancient chiftlik villages, are settled in the midst 
of the fields. The upper part of the valley, called Mali, ‘the mountain’, or Devolli i sipërm, 
‘Upper-Devoll’, has much less arable land and more pastures and forests, and is occupied 
by villages generally smaller in size. 
 
All villages (fshat) are fixed and compact settlements. They consist of at least two 
neighbourhoods (lagje), usually more, lying on both sides of the main street. Around the 
inhabited part of the village are gardens and small irrigated fields, where people grow corn, 
onions, beans, and other vegetables. The more distant fields, which used to be irrigated at 
the time of the cooperative (before 1991), are in most cases left uncultivated for lack of 
water and mechanisation. 
 
The population (around 35 000 ‘Devollis’) is mainly Albanian-speaking, with the 
exception of the village of Vërnik, which is part of the Macedonian minority of Albania. 
There is no evidence of Greek- or Arumanian-speaking population in most recent history, 
although some families claim to descend from settlers arrived from parts of Macedonia, 
which are today in Greece, or from pastoral areas in the Pindus range, across the Greek-
Albanian border. Until 1924 and the exchange of population between Greece and Turkey, a 
few villages on the Greek side of the border had close links with Devoll; they were 
inhabited by Albanian-speaking Muslims who were forced to move to Turkey. Before that 
time, they used to intermarry with Devolli, and Bilisht was their market town. 
 
Most of the Devollis are Muslims, a minority being Orthodox Christians. Among 
Muslims, some present themselves as belonging to heterodox orders, such as the Bektashi 
and Halveti orders, and they care for several locally known sacred places (for instance 
Inonisht in the village of Kuç). They however consider themselves to be Muslims and, at 
the time observations were conducted, did not express any opposition to other Muslims. 
Most of the people I have met declare a belief in God. Notwithstanding the level of 
religious practice and feelings (which of course varies from one individual to another), 
everyone is aware of belonging – at least by family origin – to a particular ‘religion’ (fe), 
Muslim or Christian. It thus possible to say that in Devoll, as elsewhere in Albania and the 
Balkans, one belongs to a religious community by attribution rather than by adherence 
(Hayden 2002: 208). Belonging to a religious community, or ‘religion’, is not only a matter 
of faith. The social implications of religious attribution are visible at different levels of 
social life. 
 
First of all, religious communities appear in the spatial distribution of local 
settlements: with the exception of the town of Bilisht, Muslims and Christians live in 
separate villages or, as is the case in the few mixed villages, in separate neighbourhoods of 
the [34] same village. Moreover, Christian villages are more often located in the mountains 
(especially in Upper Devoll) while Muslim villages are located in the plains. Studies by 
Zivkovic, Bougarel, and Alexiev have shown what use can be made, in terms of 
representations and in social relations, of the opposition between highlanders and 
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lowlanders in various Balkan contexts (Zivkovic 1997; Bougarel 1998; Alexiev 2005). We 
shall see in section 3 the role it played in Devoll, in relation to the category of ‘culture’. 
 
Social implications of religious affiliation also appear in the level of intermarriage, 
which can be taken as an indicator of the distance between both communities and which is 
extremely low. It is acknowledged by all informants that intermarriage was almost 
nonexistent before the Second World War. The genealogies I collected in Muslim villages 
reveal only exceptional marriages of Muslim men with Christian women in the first half of 
the 20th century. Later on, and especially after the ban on religion in the late 1960s, more 
intermarriage occurred. They were, however, more of an urban phenomenon and remained 
extremely rare in villages around Bilisht, even in those villages that have a mixed 
population. In fact, intermarriage rarely occurs within mixed villages. According to the 
people involved in those cases, such marriages were not easy to undertake and usually 
meant conflict between the spouses and members of older generations, who were not 
accustomed to crossing religious boundaries. 
 
Religious division of society is finally visible in the patterns of naming and labelling 
individuals and collectives. For instance, it is common to hear people talking about 
members of the other faith as belonging to another ‘nation’ or ‘race’ (komb, fis, racë) 1, or 
stressing the irreducible differences that make them distinct from people from the other 
‘religion’. Religious communities are thus clearly identified with large descent groups whose 
members share not only religious ideas and practices, but also, and perhaps most of all, 
moral characteristics and cultural features which make them distinct from the others. This 
interpretation of religious identities is confirmed by the fact that the maintenance of the 
religious boundary between Muslims and Christians seems to rest for a large part on a 
system of representations and stereotypes which have, generally speaking nothing to do 
with religion and are concerned with what appear as the basic moral values and their 
opposites (courage and cowardice, violence and cold-bloodedness, intelligence and 
stupidity, honesty and wickedness, etc.). Through this system of stereotypes, both Muslims 
and Christians hold a peculiar position in the ethic values of local society. For instance, 
Christians claim to be hard-workers who save their money while they criticise Muslims 
from neighbouring villages for being lazy and for spending lavishly. On the other side, 
Muslims consider their spending of money to be a mark of generosity and hospitality 
(turning a negative value into a positive one) and they logically accuse Christians of 
miserliness. In this case, as in similar ones (de Rapper 2002b), one of the terms is usually 
valued as ‘civilised’ (me kulturë) and the other as ‘uncivilised’ (pa kulturë). Working hard and 
saving money is thus considered more civilised than spending one’s time and money in 
bars and coffee shops. As a consequence, Muslims [35] and Christians sometimes appear to 
be competing for a higher level of kulturë or ‘civilisation’. Before examining this 
‘competition’, it is necessary to have a closer look at local ideas about ‘culture’. 
 
 
                                                 
1 For a discussion of the meaning of these words in Devoll, see de Rapper (forthcoming). 
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Culture 
 
The Albanian word kulturë is probably best translated as ‘civilisation’, if we have in 
mind the opposition between German Kultur and French civilisation as described by Elias 
(Elias 1973). The word is used in Devoll to qualify ideas and behaviours, practices and 
artefacts in the spheres of family and gender relations, architecture, food, clothes, and 
education. Albanian kulturë shares with ‘civilisation’ its close connection to the West: it is 
explicitly said to come from Western Europe and Northern America. When a feature 
qualified as me kulturë is opposed to another one qualified as pa kulturë, the former can 
generally be understood as more ‘European’ and the latter as more ‘local’ or, as we shall 
see, ‘Oriental’. We shall also see in the next section that this Western orientation is typical 
of ‘culture’ in the post-communist context. In earlier periods it might have been more 
ambiguous, for instance when modernising trends would come from the Soviet Union or, 
earlier in history, from Istanbul. 
 
To ‘have culture’ means, for instance, speaking foreign languages, among which 
English, French, and Italian are today especially valued. It also means speaking Albanian in 
the standardised form rather than in a local dialect. Depending on context, Devollis will 
either insist on the proximity of their dialect to the ‘literate language’ (gjuhë letrare), both 
based on southern variants of Albanian, or on its local peculiarities which make it a ‘coarse’ 
(i trashë) language. In the first case, they assert their belonging to what is generally 
considered as the more ‘civilised’ part of Albania; in the second case, they put forward their 
local characters, as inhabitants of a peripheral and rural area. The standardised language is 
also evidence of a better education and a prerequisite for contact with the outside world. 
This explains why schools and education are themselves a part of ‘culture’. They are an 
indicator of the village’s level of modernisation and they allow villagers an access to 
knowledge about the outside world. 
 
The stress on ‘culture’ as something superior and coming from the West does not 
mean that local ‘culture’ is not valued at all. For instance, when they contrast their 
generosity and hospitality with the miserliness of their Christian neighbours, Muslim 
Devollis claim that such local (and national) traditional values illustrate their moral 
superiority over Christians. Moreover, the valorisation of tradition and local heritage is 
itself a part of ‘culture’: to care for your own past is to be ‘civilised’. The protection of 
environment, architectural heritage, and traditional songs and dances is an indicator of 
‘culture’. On the contrary, the ‘uncivilised’ do not know where they come from. They have 
no ‘roots’ (rrënjë) and are ready to destroy their heritage (in the same way as they spend 
money without counting). In this matter, the outside world (Europe) is again presented as 
the model to be followed. In the summer of 1996, complaining about people from the 
neighbouring Muslim village cutting wood in his village’s forests, a Christian villager told 
me: “Everywhere in the world, forests are protected with fanaticism, but here, they 
[Muslims] know only to destroy them”. ‘Culture’ thus poses the question of imitation: it has 
to [36] be acquired from outside, through imitation of foreign models; but the ‘cultured’ 
one should be able to distinguish between what is to be copied and what is to be avoided. 
As Alexandra Bakalaki reminds us in another context (the modernisation of Greek society 
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in the 1950s and 1960s), there is nothing worse that those copies non conformes which only 
prove one’s inability to assimilate culture and modernity (Bakalaki 2005). 
 
To sum up, kulturë has to do with ‘high culture’ rather than with culturalist ideas 
about culture. It does not reflect the identity of a particular group but is, on the contrary, 
universal and normative. It also appears to be a means of  classifying people by referring to 
a third term, Europe or the West. There are, so to speak, two kinds of people: the ones 
who have kulturë, and the ones who do not. The first ones are superior because they are 
closer to the West; they are ‘in advance’ (përpara) because they are already familiar with what 
is seen as the future, westernisation. ‘Culture’ is thus a synonym for ‘progress’ and 
‘modernity’. In Devoll, Christians claim to have more ‘culture’ than Muslims, and Muslims 
generally look at Christians as having more ‘culture’. Where does this Christian high level 
of ‘culture’ come from? 
 
 
Muslims, Christians and the origin of ‘culture’ 
 
In this section, I would like to give the main features of the general pattern that 
connects the Christian Devollis with ‘culture’. Culture is not only connected to the future 
as the road that leads toward Europe; it is also rooted in the past: the high level of culture 
enjoyed by Christians is the result of history. A man from Arëzë, a Muslim village in Upper 
Devoll, says: 
 
Christian villages are superior to Muslim ones. People have more culture, they are 
cleaner. This is because they went on migration (kurbet) and received more influence 
from outside. 
 
It is generally acknowledged that Christians took their culture from outside. 
Christianity is sometimes said to be of higher culture by itself, or because of its anteriority 
to Islam. Most of the time, however, the distinction between Muslims and Christians in 
terms of culture refers to a specific period of time, the time of kurbet. 
 
Christians are said to be the first ones to have left their villages in Devoll to work in 
foreign cities and distant lands. In this historical pattern, Christians would leave for periods 
of time from several months to five years or more and come back from abroad with 
money, with new ideas and behaviours, and with new technologies and skills. At the same 
time, Muslims would remain on their fields and lands, with no connection with the outside 
world except for the ‘Oriental’ Turkish empire. A man from Miras, another Muslim village, 
explains: 
 
Christian villages have more culture because they went on migration, and they brought 
culture back from the countries they went to, especially from America. They would go 
on migration more easily because they had more money. They had more money 
because they were clever, and they were clever because they had schools. 
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In this view, Christians seem to be engaged in a virtuous cycle (schools Æ 
intelligence Æ money Æ migration Æ culture Æ schools) from which Muslims seem to be 
[37] excluded. A Christian man from Sinicë, a mixed village in Upper Devoll, also links 
culture with schools and migration, and adds another explicative factor: land ownership. 
 
At the time of the Turkish empire, Christians had no right to possess land. This is why 
they would choose to go to school or to migrate. That is why they received more 
influence from abroad. This is what happened to the Christian villages in Devoll, and 
also in Dropull2: they have more culture. 
 
I will come back later to the role of history (and especially of pre-communist history) 
in local interpretations of Muslim/Christian differences. What the local explanations 
quoted above seem to reveal is the use of ‘culture’ as an expression for what can be 
considered as a kind of ‘class conflict’. Behind the culture granted to Christians, it is 
possible to see the valorisation of an urban or cosmopolitan educated elite threatened by 
ill-mannered and ‘stupid’ peasants who nonetheless hold power positions in the ‘Turkish 
empire’. Such a pattern opposing the educated to the ‘rustics’ (Murray 1978: 237) has been 
studied in other historical contexts (Vernant 1966; Murray 1978) and seems to rely on 
general distinctions between village and town, local and cosmopolitan, mountains and 
plains. It is striking, for instance, how Christian villages are described by both their 
inhabitants and the Muslims of nearby villages as characterised by ‘urban’ features: villagers 
are said to live ‘as in city’ (si në qytet). Paved streets, two-storeys houses, electricity, water 
adduction, and sewerage systems are all said to have been known in Christian villages as 
early as the 1930s, while Muslim villages have supposedly remained, even today, extremely 
‘rural’. Also, as noted earlier, schools and literacy are, almost without exception, associated 
with Christians. In this competition for the oldest schools opened in the region, the usual 
nationalist rhetoric stigmatising Greek schools and valuing the first Albanian schools is of 
little concern: no matter what the language was, Christian villages were the first ones to 
send their children to school and thus to grant them access to ‘culture’. In this pattern, 
literacy not only provides an access to valuable knowledge about the world, it also makes 
you aware of who you are and where you come from. One day in the winter of 1996, after 
collecting a genealogy from a family in the Muslim village of Menkulas, the conversation 
with my hosts went on with questions of family and kinship organisation. One of the 
family men, in order to explain and justify the difficulties they encountered in the 
recollection of the family’s ancestors, suggested a typical comparison between Muslims and 
Christians: 
 
Christians know their family lines (fis) much better than Muslims. It is because they get 
married in church, where they keep a written record of all the names. They can always 
go back to these documents and find information on their family lines. We Muslims get 
                                                 
2 Dropull is the name of the upper part of the Drino valley, between Gjirokastër and the Greek border. It 
is inhabited by Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians who, starting at the end of the 19th century, used to 
migrate to the United States. The region is thus known for its higher level of development and culture. 
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married in the town hall: we have no written record dating back before the creation of 
the state. 
 
[38] In this case, it is worth noticing that the distinction between Muslims and 
Christians is not presented as an absolute one: the former also have access to written 
records, but it came later in time; Christians were first but Muslims are following them. The 
distinction between Muslims and Christians in terms of ‘culture’ is indeed generally 
presented as the result of a historical process which was first experienced by Christians: 
driven from the plains to the mountains by Muslims who enjoyed a better socio-economic 
position in the Ottoman empire, Christians were forced to migrate in order to escape the 
less hospitable environment of mountain villages. Migration provided them with money to 
build schools and modernise their villages; it also connected them to the West and its 
‘culture’, and that is why they are ‘in advance’. 
 
Although expressed in a simplified and mechanical way, this process probably has 
some historical truth. Pirro Thomo, from the village of Dardhë, has shown how work 
migration was responsible for the development of his Christian mountain village at the 
beginning of the 20th century (Thomo 1985). Nathalie Clayer confirms that, during the 
second half of the 19th century, migration first involved Christian inhabitants of the sandjak 
of Korçë (as well as those of Bitola, of today’s Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
and Servia, of today’s Northern Greece) while Muslims were encouraged by Ottoman 
authorities to stay within the empire, where they formed a pool of potential recruits for the 
army (Clayer 2007: 126). Many Muslims from the area – and from Devoll in particular – 
would, however, migrate and work in cities of the empire. Contrary to what Christians 
claim today, they were not excluded from migration and were also responsible for the 
socio-economic transformations the region experienced at the beginning of the 20th 
century. Muslims migrants actually played a role later on, after Albania became an 
independent state (1913), when they started working in North America, Australia, and 
elsewhere. Some Muslim villages in Devoll, such as Sul, are represented today by their 
inhabitants as having been touched by migration just like Christian villages: returnees 
would build large stone houses giving the village a more ‘urban’ look, they would bring 
back objects and habits unknown to the locals, and they are said to have raised funds to 
open the first Albanian school in the village, around 1914-1916, when only a few villages 
had such schools. It is worth noting that in 1996, inhabitants of Sul were pleased to tell me 
that there was no coffee shop in the village: according to them, it was a sign of ‘culture’ not 
to spend their time drinking or playing cards instead of working, like they supposedly do in 
other Muslim villages. 
 
Generally speaking, however, according to Nathalie Clayer, the unequal access to 
long distance migration in the late 19th century worked to reinforce the difference between 
Muslims and Christians – a situation that reminds us of present-day migration to Greece, in 
which Muslims are again less favoured than Christians. She also points out that the region 
experienced reforms that other Albanian-inhabited regions of the empire did not 
experience (Clayer 2007: 127). Social and political transformations resulting from these 
reforms include the development of an educated middle class (both Muslim and Christian), 
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as is, for instance, illustrated in the case of Korçë with the demand of ‘modern’ pieces of 
furniture by ‘many families’ (Ciko 1983: 286-287). As a result, some local artisans went and 
spent a few months in the West in order to ‘get acquainted with modern advances in [their] 
field and learn from them in the hope of gaining a large clientele’ (Ciko 1983: 286).  
 
[39] Also of importance, the beginning of the 20th century witnessed the growing 
involvement of foreigners (mostly Europeans) in the internal affairs of that part of the 
empire, and especially in the protection of its Christian inhabitants, a fact that is likely to 
have modified the relations between Muslims and Christians (Clayer 2007: 128). In Devoll, 
Muslims and Christians alike admit that the latter benefited from Greek support in their 
access to ‘culture’, especially through the funding of schools at the end of the 19th century, 
and that that became a source of inequality. Such a situation reminds us, once again, of the 
one that prevailed in the 1990s and 2000s. As such, Christians are said to be favoured by 
Greece, either in migration or through local projects in Albania. Those parallels are not 
only indicative of a kind of continuity in the relations between Muslims and Christians in 
this border area; they are also an evidence of how the present informs the past and its 
significations. 
 
It is indeed unlikely that the relation of Muslims and Christians with the idea of 
‘culture’, as observed in the 1990s, was shaped entirely a century before. The focus on the 
period of kurbet should not be taken for granted and should rather be understood in the 
context of post-communist Albania: the liberalisation of religion and the revitalisation of 
religious communities, together with the opening of the country’s borders and renewed 
contact with the West in the early 1990s, are likely to be responsible for the centrality of the 
idea of ‘culture’ in Muslim/Christian relations. 
 
Communist Albania most likely played a role in the reshaping of those relations in 
terms of ‘culture’. It is striking, for instance, that the content given to ‘culture’ when people 
refer to kurbet and its impact is very close to what were (and, to some extent, still are) 
presented as the major achievements of communist Albania. In their study of ‘changes in 
the way of life of today’s peasantry’, published in 1985, anthropologists Andromaqi Gjergji, 
Abaz Dojaka, and Mark Tirta review the consequences of socio-economic transformations 
on the way of life in villages all over the country (Gjergji, Dojaka & Tirta 1985). Their 
altogether optimistic assessment starts with the ‘material conditions of existence’, including 
the following topics: village planimetry, water distribution, roads, commerce and 
craftsmanship, cultural institutions (museum, libraries), domestic architecture and 
equipment, electrification, personal hygiene, clothes, and food. Family and gender relations 
are studied as another indicator of modernisation. The growing number of nuclear families, 
to the detriment of joint families, is seen as a positive change. It is considered to be 
evidence of the loss of authority of the traditional patriarchal family and to allow for inter-
generational and gender relations which are considered more in accordance with urban and 
modern patterns. The development of education and literacy is also presented as a major 
feature in the modernisation of villages, together with the eradication of religious beliefs 
and practices. Finally, population movements and displacements are seen as a fundamental 
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factor in development and modernisation as they break isolation and open up people’s 
minds to the world outside their villages. 
 
All these features (material condition of existence, family relations, education, and 
contact through migration) have been identified as what ‘culture’ means to today’s Devollis 
(de Rapper 2002a: 194-195). There seems to be a clear parallel between ‘culture’ as it is 
understood today and the communist modernist project. Even if the West is not [40] 
mentioned in the communist project as the source of ‘culture’ and as a model to be 
followed, modernisation is conceived, first of all, as the realisation of a kind of universal 
model and to a lesser extent as the realisation of a peculiar Albanian ‘culture’. Communism 
was ‘the future of the world’ (Lubonja 2002: 94); a dream that had become reality outside 
national borders, in the Soviet Union, but whose realisation was expected in Albania. 
 
What was the state of relations between Muslims and Christians in Devoll during that 
period? I have no data on the participation of Muslims and Christians in the partisan 
movement during the Second World War and the communist takeover of the 1940s. The 
role of southern Christians in the development of the communist movement is generally 
acknowledged and I have found no evidence of strong anti-communist feelings among the 
Christians I met. Many of them have had access to interesting careers in various 
administrations and do not seem to have been underrepresented in highly trained 
professions (engineers, doctors, teachers, etc.). Some of them, for reasons relating to their 
status as members of a national minority, are said to have been favoured by the regime: the 
Macedonian-speaking Christians of Vërnik supposedly had a privileged access to university 
education. 
 
As noted earlier, intermarriage remained the exception even after 1967, when, to 
quote a Christian informant from Sinicë, whose son has married a Muslim woman, ‘Enver 
Hoxha decided that Muslims and Christians were all alike’. Some people from the Christian 
villages of Upper Devoll tell that traditional religious endogamy became a problem when, 
in the 1960s and 1970s, more and more Christian girls got married in town rather than in 
their own villages, as used to be the rule, in order to escape from life and work in 
agricultural cooperatives. As a man from those villages, married to a Muslim woman, says 
pleasantly, ‘that was the time when we Christian boys were sent to Muslim villages to bring 
back wives.’ Many families also left at that time to go to Korçë or Tirana in search for a 
better and urban life; as a result, at the beginning of the 1990s, Christian villages were 
generally less populated than Muslim ones. Given the restriction upon village-to-town 
migration in communist times, the ongoing opportunities for Christians to leave their 
villages can be interpreted as a sign of their better position among the communist 
authorities and networks, a point that would however need further investigation. It 
nevertheless sustains the idea of a privileged relation of Christians to the urban world, both 
in actual practice and in representations, and in the eyes of both Christians and Muslims. 
According to one informant from Sul, the village of Bradvicë, located in the mountain 
above Sul, is illustrative of this pattern: due to the high official positions held by some of its 
inhabitants in the communist state or party, many of their families eventually moved to 
Tirana, leaving the village almost empty. By the 1990s, some of them started to come back 
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to the village on holidays, turning old abandoned houses into second homes and thus 
bringing new habits: such a use of village territory and buildings was considered an 
innovation, known only the Greek villages on the other side of the border. 
 
Finally, other observations seem to support the idea of the relatively privileged 
position of Christians during communism: for instance, and as far as I could determine, the 
destruction of places of cult in 1967 and afterwards seems to have been more systematic in 
the case of Muslim places, while Christian places (although closed as cult places and 
dedicated to secular usage) have more often been spared as ‘cultural monuments’ [41] 
(monument kulture). Also, as far as I could determine, religious first names, formally 
forbidden in 1976, seem to have survived better among Christians than among Muslims. 
They seem to have reappeared more easily after 1990, for newborn children as well as for 
children and adults who got baptised when religious practices were authorised again. 
Muslim names, on the contrary, do not seem to have regained favour. 
 
Once again, this is indicative of the fact that, notwithstanding the impact of 
communism, the present state of relations between Muslims and Christians and their 
competing claims for ‘culture’ cannot be explored without taking into account the context 
of the 1990s. The ‘resurfacing’ of Christianity at the beginning of the 1990s seems to have 
preceded the ‘resurfacing of Islam’ (Trix 1995).  For instance, in the case of the 
reconstruction of cult places in Bilisht, the reconstruction of the Orthodox church of Saint 
Veneranda (Shën e Premte) started in 1992, three years before the new mosque was built 
(1995). 
 
This context actually sheds light on what ‘culture’ means: the stress on the West as 
the origin of ‘culture’, as found in the ‘historic’ narratives on culture and kurbet, can 
probably not be dissociated from what Fatos Lubonja calls ‘the myth of the West’ (Lubonja 
2002; 2004), as it developed in the early 1990s. On the one hand, the idealisation of the 
West as a Promised Land or as a Saviour was probably nourished by memories of pre-war 
migration to America. On the other hand, this idealisation certainly contributed to the 
valorisation of kurbet as a Golden Age and as the origin of ‘culture’. In other words, the 
myth of the West is at the same time a product of migration memory and a producer of 
this memory. ‘Culture’, along with the Christian religion, became at that time a highly 
symbolic factor in asserting a European or Western identity. Just as ‘the Christianity of the 
Albanians before the Turkish invasion was treated as a Western identity’ (Lubonja 2002: 
101), so was the ‘culture’ of Christians before communism (in the Devoll) treated as 
evidence of their readiness to come back to Europe and the West. On the contrary, 
Muslims are generally associated with the East: most of their characteristics are said to be 
of Turkish and Arabic origin (they behave allaturka while Christians behave allafranga) and 
some of them, regarding the status of women for instance, are considered to be 
‘orientalisms’ (orientalizëm). As a Westerner, I have been frequently asked to assess the 
degree of ‘orientalism’ of various elements of Albanian culture: did Albanian music sound 
oriental to me? Did Albanian food taste oriental to me? 
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Negotiating ‘culture’ 
 
‘Culture’ thus appears very close to the idea of ‘progress’ identified by Bojidar 
Alexiev as a means to ‘classify human communities in two groups, backward and 
advanced’, which can be superposed on a pre-existing religious difference (Alexiev 2005: 
31). The local rationalisation of ‘culture’ in historical terms gives Christians symbolic 
advantages in the context of the 1990s by emphasising their proximity to the West and 
their ability to get even closer. This last section is an attempt to show that Muslims are 
nonetheless not passive victims of this symbolic domination by Christians. Unlike religious 
affiliation, often taken, as noted earlier, for a kind of ‘racial’ identity, ‘culture’ can be 
negotiated. 
 
We have seen with the case of Sul that Muslim villages sometimes claim participation 
in the historical pattern which links ‘culture’ to pre-war migration to the West. [42] 
Historical and genealogical data actually support the idea that migration occurred among 
Muslim villages and that it had the same kind of impact it had on Christian villages in terms 
of innovation and modernisation, although on a reduced scale. In the same way, individuals 
can be granted ‘culture’ notwithstanding their religious affiliation. The criteria will, 
however, be the same as the ones which make Christians more ‘cultured’ than Muslims: 
language and education, behaviour, knowledge or direct contact with the West, etc. 
Actually, because ‘culture’ is conceived as a universal and historic trend that leads humanity 
from backwardness to modernity, even Christians who claim that they have more ‘culture’ 
than Muslims recognise that the latter (at least in Devoll) are becoming more and more 
‘cultured’. This process occurs either by imitating Christians or by direct contact with the 
West through labour migration. In the mixed village of Sinicë, an elderly Christian man 
explains for instance that: 
 
Muslims are not acting as Christians are. (…) As for the wedding, Christians get 
married as they do in the West: they go to church and then have a party. Ten years ago, 
Muslims would practice another kind of marriage, but now they copy the Christian way. 
 
At the same time, Christians commonly stigmatise the inability or unwillingness of 
Muslims to ‘learn’ (mësoj) from Christians. In the same village, a young educated Christian 
explains that: 
 
Even in Sinicë, which is a mixed village, Muslims are lower, they have less culture than 
Christians. This makes me think that the differences between Muslims and Christians 
are hereditary up to 90%. Muslims from Sinicë have the opportunity to enter Christian 
homes, but they just don’t learn; they won’t change. 
 
The general pattern is, however, to recognise that Muslims have changed and that, by 
imitating Christian ways, they are becoming more ‘cultured’. 
 
The idea of Muslims becoming closer to Christians finally allows Muslims to take 
part in ‘culture’ at a more collective level. When opposing themselves, as inhabitants of a 
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specific region, to other regions in Albania, Muslims and Christians alike typically claim a 
high level of ‘culture’. The qualities generally granted to Christians (migration, open-
mindedness, peacefulness, hard work) are then attributed to all inhabitants, as Devollis 
rather than as Muslims or Christians. With respect to the rest of Albania, Devollis claim – 
and to a certain extent are recognized as having – a higher level of ‘culture’. This is 
especially the case when they compare their southern region to northern regions of 
Albania, who are commonly said to lack ‘culture’. There is a striking parallel between the 
way Christians talk about Muslims as having less ‘culture’ – within the context of Devoll – 
and the way both Muslim and Christian Devollis talk about ‘Northerners’ (ata të veriut). The 
latter are presented as violent and backward mountain people – generally referred to by the 
derogatory name malok, from mal, ‘mountain’ – who, until recently, lacked everything that 
contributed to the state of ‘culture’ enjoyed by Devollis: they speak a coarse dialect very far 
from standardised Albanian; they live in poor conditions of hygiene and are not familiar 
with contemporary cooking or clothes; they are scattered in small familial settlements [43] 
instead of living in large villages (which, as noted earlier, are often described as being closer 
to urban models); they live under the rule of severe traditions, especially in the spheres of 
religion and of family and gender relations; and they have greater difficulty adapting to a 
foreign environment when they migrate to Greece or Italy. It is common to hear 
contrasted descriptions of northern and local migrants in terms of border crossings (the 
former cross illegally, the latter legally), work relations (the former are untrustworthy and 
lazy), and so on. The parallels between Christian stereotypes of Muslims and southern 
stereotypes of northerners are so remarkable that I suggested in a previous publication that 
mutual representations of Muslims and Christians, in the context of Devoll, can be 
considered as a matrix for representations of more distant groups (de Rapper 2004). 
 
The Devollis’ collective and regional claim to a higher ‘culture’ exitsts also in relation 
to Greece. Migrants from Devoll – largely Muslim – who live and work in Greece seem to 
refer to ‘culture’ in reaction to the discrimination and bad treatment they experience in that 
country, as Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers suggests (Schwandner-Sievers 2004: 120). 
Although Greece is known as an entry point to the West, or as a part of the West, Devollis 
are quick to criticise Greeks – and especially their Greek employers – for having a lower 
level of ‘culture’: their education system is said to be of low quality, most of them are said 
to have been to school for a very short time and to have very little knowledge on the 
outside world (and especially of Albania); they are also said to spend a lot of time in coffee 
shops and bars while their Albanian employees are working hard. In this case ‘culture’ is 
not attributed or denied to religious groups but national ones. Nevertheless, because the 
border between Greece and Albania in Devoll is easily perceived (on both sides) as a 
border between a Christian country and a Muslim one and because Devolli migrants usually 
feel discriminated against as Muslims, the stigmatisation of Greeks as less ‘cultured’ might 
be interpreted as a way to assert the higher level of ‘culture’ of local Muslims. 
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Conclusion 
 
I have tried to show how local ideas about ‘culture’ can inform us about the meaning 
of being Muslim or Christian in Devoll in the 1990s. ‘Culture’ appears as a way to classify 
people by reference to a third term, the West, perceived as the place of origin of ‘culture’. 
This classification seems to be easily superposed on the religious opposition between 
Muslims and Christians. As a result, each ‘religion’ is granted a level of ‘culture’ and a 
position in local society. Such an easy superposition can be explained by the fact that 
Muslims and Christians – notwithstanding the usual assertions of the irrelevance of 
religious identities in Albanian society – already consider themselves to belong to two 
distinct groups which should not intermarry and which claim to have their own moral 
values. Christians are generally recognized as having more ‘culture’, but this superior 
position is challenged in various ways and is sometimes shared with Muslims. The relative 
positions of Muslims and Christians thus appear to be changing not only in time, as has 
probably been the case, but according to the ‘system’ they are considered to be parts of: a 
single mixed village in which Muslims and Christians live side by side; a group a villages 
competing for land or other resources; Devoll and its upper and lower parts; Devoll in 
relation with the city and district of Korçë; southern Albania opposed to [44] northern 
Albania; Devoll as a border district. For this reason, it seems difficult to talk about 
Muslim/Christian relations in Albania without taking into account local configurations and 
the way they relate Muslims and Christians to wider configurations. 
 
Furthermore, the stress on ‘culture’ by both Muslims and Christians is indicative of 
the fact that studies of religious coexistence in Albania should not be limited to religious 
manifestations (either common practices or evidences of extremism and hatred), but 
should also take into account all social representations and practices that are used to create 
and reproduce differences between the local groups identified as ‘religions’. In that way, the 
reshaping of relations between these groups appears as one of the various reconfigurations 
taking place in post-socialist Albania. On one hand, it shows that, notwithstanding the 
communist ban, religion has remained a means of classifying people; on the other hand it 
emphasises the fact that post-socialist religious revitalisation goes beyond the sole 
manifestations of religious feelings and practices. 
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